Barbados and OECD Developments


As a a low tax jurisdiction, Barbados has traditionally never considered itself to be part of the uncooperative tax havens as listed by the OECD over the past ten years in its primary and revised lists. For despite random listing and delisting, the jurisdiction has always been one of transparency and low taxation in much of its international business sector. It has relied on a policy of propelling growth through the rapid extension of its double tax treaty network. Indeed, the presence of such a network allows for international tax structuring that, while resulting in some cases of tax deferral and low tax payments,clearly discourages tax evasion.

Furthermore, its treaties contain the standard exchange of information provisions; and while such exchanges may never be fishing expeditions as long established in law, they do provide for the routine exchanges.  Moreover, from as early as 1986, the jurisdiction had additionally signed a Tax Information Exchange Agreement with the United States of America as part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative.


Following the report in 1998 (“Harmful Tax Competition” An Emerging Global Issue”) the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) created a special forum, “Forum on Harmful Tax Practices”. To end harmful tax practices, the work of the Forum has focused on three areas: Harmful tax practices in Member Countries; Tax havens; and Involving non-OECD economies.  The Forum has produced a number of progress reports.  In addition,, in conjunction with supposedly cooperative tax havens, the Forum has produced a “Model Tax Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters”.  In the absence of a definition of harmful tax competition, the 1998 OECD report distinguishes between tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes in otherwise high tax jurisdictions. According to the report, the problem of harmful tax competition starts with no taxation or a low rate of taxation. The report concentrates on four key factors to identify tax havens: no or only nominal taxes; lack of effective exchange of information; lack of transparency; and no substantial activities.  Four key factors also identify harmful preferential tax regimes in otherwise high tax countries; no or low effective tax rates; “ring fencing” of regimes; lack of transparency; and lack of effective exchange of information. At present, the initiative concentrates only on making countries pledge to engage in transparency and the effective exchange of information.  At one point, the OECD listed Barbados as tax haven, but subsequently removed it.


Although not a party to the first Tax and Crime Conference hosted on 21 to 23 March 2011 by the Norwegian government, Barbados policies are however consistent with the spirit and aims of the conference.  For this important conference aimed to find more effective ways to counter financial crime, tax evasion, and other illicit flows through more efficient international and interagency cooperation.  The conference agreed that the OECD working with other international organisations and interacted parties will adopt the following:

  • Establish a global dialogue on inter-agency collaboration to better fight financial crimes including illicit financial flows.  A platform for sharing operational experiences could support this dialogue.
  • Immediately advance the issues discussed at Oslo through an OCED Task Force, which will focus on:Improving inter-agency cooperation by mapping out different models of cooperation, their advantages and challenges with a view to developing best practice standards, and with a particular focus on the contribution that tax administrations can make in this regard
  • Improving the understanding and use of international cooperation mechanisms by cataloguing all relevant forms and instruments for international cooperation in fighting financial crime
  • Supporting sustainable development and fiscal transparency by seeking to assess areas of biggest benefit to developing countries from the “whole of government approach”.


Within this current milieu, Barbados’ response is yet again one of reviewing its own internal processes, bearing in mind that investors look at substance and not form; indeed, they look to see what the jurisdiction has to offer in a macro sense and how the micro facilitating processes work within the jurisdiction.  The jurisdiction therefore continues to consider the impact of developing investment and trade in services agreements on sub-service sectors such as tourism and culture.  For, in addition to serving as potential alternatives to Double Tax Agreements, such agreements can be useful to the development of services by themselves.

Furthermore, the dynamic nature of the international enforcement initiative, globalization, free trade agreements, the information industry and other developments has caused Barbados to retool its ongoing international strategies. In this regard, the decision to host a regional centre for arbitration is proving to be an important strategy in a growing services area.  Barbados is also rethinking its role as a regional centre for philanthropy and has buttressed its own nonprofit and charity legislation.

Barbados has always philosophically accepted that a self-managed entity is a critical part of a successful captive insurance paradigm.  Energy Insurance Mutual, the Swiss Re affiliates and the various Canadian banks’ insurance management structures, in this regard, represent true exemplars. The jurisdiction now houses more self-managed captives than any other domicile with approximately 22 such entities. It is understood that such structures increasinglyallow for cost savings, effective parental quality control and group cost savings.  Due regulatory recognition of this type of structure continues and gives respect to a form of organization now growing more popular globally, but which has deep roots within the Barbadian insurance infrastructure.  Nine self-managed entities are from captive domiciles within OECD countries, while ten areexternal.  The numbers tell the story.

Furthermore, within the ten captive domiciles, Barbados ranks seventh. With approximately 242 on the Barbados books, the island ranks ahead in numbers of the OECD homes of Utah 188 and Hawaii 168.  However, in terms of premiums, Barbados does not number within the top ten which comprises the OCED’s, Vermont, Luxembourg, South Carolina, Ireland and Hawaii;nor does it rank in the top tenin the category of assets under management with the leader being the OECD’s Vermont (US$134,400 million), Ireland (US$7,500) and Hawaii (US$7,273). While numbers do not always tell the whole story,  there are yet useful indicators on which to build and frame ongoing and future policy which the OECD by its own presence will find difficulty in attacking.  Hence, although it may be difficult to build up an asset management niche overnight and house those vast insurance-related assets,  the proposed international trading floor will also add significantly to the overall financial diversification and versatility of the jurisdiction as a buttress to the hollow and vacuous OECD reports of many pages.


Barbados’ defensive OECD policy therefore rests in a belief in itself and in its potential for self-sustaining growth based on a continued policy of transparency.  Its international financial services sector is mature, fuelled by double tax treaties, bilateral investment treaties, international insurance, international banking as well as the other growing service sector areas.  It seeks not to be defensive in relation to the OECD since its historic transparency and good governance allows it to work safely and successfully in enabling its own future.